IMPASSE AT EI ALAMEIN

IMPASSE AT EI ALAMEIN

In the morning [125] July 4, 1942 Panzer Army “Africa” ​​was in a very dangerous position. Afrika Korps had thirty-six serviceable tanks and several hundred infantry, exhausted to the last degree. Artillery, however, was very much because we seized a large number of British guns, but our German guns were almost out of ammunition (15th division had two shots on the instrument). Fortunately, in Deir el Shein was fired in 1500 for 25-pounders, but the Italians still had some stock.
However, without a doubt, we could not resist a determined attack of the 8th Army. Now we know that July 4 Auchinleck given away. order for such an attack, but, as so often happened in the desert, he could not bring his corps commanders to act. The 5th New Zealand Brigade engaged the enemy with the division “Brescia” in El Mireyrskoy depression, and British tanks, which began promotion Ridge Ruwaysat, threatened to cut the 15th Division into two parts. But in striking at the British did not feel any force or pressure, and usually only had a few shots of the 88-mm guns to stop their tank attack. In general, July 4th we had just nervous – there was no serious loss.
July 5th our situation has improved somewhat. The New Zealanders, however, began to show some activity on the southern sector of the front, but the 4th Infantry Brigade on the march got under the powerful impact of dive bombers, destroying the brigade headquarters, apparently, saved us from the enemy’s offensive in the direction of El Mireyr. On the ridge Ruwaysat 15th division had about 15 tanks, 100 tanks against the 1st Armored Division, but no attack by the enemy was not followed. The passivity of the British on July 5 is particularly worthy of reproach, as Auchinleck instructed his subordinates to do us a decisive blow, and on the ridge Ruwaysat arrived perfectly fresh connection – 24th Australian Brigade.
July 6 Rommel continued to regroup their forces and the strengthening of the front, we were delivered mines and small replenishment for the 90th legkopehotnoy divisions and armored divisions. The number of tanks in the African body has increased to forty-four, and we started to create a mobile reserve. The British lost the opportune moment, and although Auchinleck could still defeat us, every day is becoming more difficult.
The morning of July 9 Rommel became known that the enemy left stronghold Caret el Abd, he immediately ordered 21 Panzer Division and “Lit-Torio” take it and flipped the 90th Division to attack the right of these compounds. We are somewhat puzzled that the British left such a favorable position, and even now I am surprised that Auchinleck made ​​such a decision. However, because of this, he pulled some of our forces to the south and increased the chances of success of the offensive, which was going to take at Tel el Eisa, but [126] still renting a well-fortified position as coach El-Abd was too expensive price.
At dawn on July 10 the enemy opened heavy artillery fire on the division “Sabratha”, was situated against the Western facades stronghold of El Alamein, and then followed by a virulent attack of the 9th Australian Division along the coastal highway in the direction of Tel el Eisa. Panzer Army headquarters was located on the shore just a few kilometers from the front line, and in the morning I was surprised to see how hundreds of Italians fled in panic by Staff. Rommel was a strong point Caret el Abd, far to the south, and I myself had to decide what to do. When there is a threat of Staff, the first is always the desire – to run and save his most valuable possessions and documents. I realized that with the division “Sabratha” done – its artillery was already in the “bag” – and immediately wanted to do something to cover up the road to the west. I have compiled a headquarters staff and somehow organized the defense, reinforcing it with our anti-aircraft guns and infantry reinforcements had come up randomly. As a result, managed to contain the Australians, who have already captured the cemetery Tel el Eisa and tried to break through along the coastal highway. Unfortunately, in this battle, lost most of our units intercept together with its excellent commander, Lieutenant Zeebomom {147} .
July 10 came the main body 382 th Infantry Regiment, they were part of the 164th Infantry Division – the first significant reinforcements, received by us from Europe. The British were late with his attack on the same day – without this reinforcement northern flank of the Panzer Army could be broken. In the afternoon came from the southern area Rommel with the division headquarters for the defense and quickly formed a battle group from the 15th Division. Leaving the battle these forces, he tried to cut off the ledge formed by the Australians at Tel el Eisa, an attack from the south, but the artillery fire from El Alamein was too strong and gave no opportunity to achieve the the goal.
July 11 Australians resumed their attack to the south of the coastal highway, they inflicted severe losses Division “Trieste” and was only stopped by the concentrated fire of our army artillery. The most characteristic feature of the new battle was that the Italian troops could no longer hold their ground.
July 12 Australians have suspended their attacks, apparently, they were fixed on the occupied areas. Rommel moved to the northern section of the 21-th division, decided on July 13 to launch an attack directly on the stronghold of El Alamein, seize this critical position and cut the Australians at Tel el Eisa {148} . It would be a real victory that could not even open the way to the Nile. Rommel as he says, “the offensive was supported by all the instruments and all the planes, which we could. Collect” {149} .
21th Division at noon on July 13 attacked the stronghold of El Alamein, with the strong support of the dive bombers and under cover, the entire army artillery fire. Unfortunately, the 21 th Infantry Division turned to attack too far away from the leading edge, resulting in the effect of the bombing was not immediately used, and the attacking troops were stopped by artillery and machine guns of the defenders, before he could even overcome the [127] wire fences. Aviation was ordered to resume the attack, concentrating them this time on the enemy artillery positions and tanks moved forward, opening fire on a reference point to concrete structures. However, all of our attacks failed because of the stubborn resistance of the third South African Brigade {150} .
July 14 Rommel moved the 21 th Division on the west, and he ordered her to attack again, this time to the position of Australians southeast of Tel el Eisa, and break through to the sea. In the evening, using the sun blinds the enemy, 21 Division launched an attack under cover of a powerful air strike. Again infantry rose to the attack too late, so paralyzing bombardment was not used. Nevertheless, we have reached the coastal railway and could do more if it were not bothering flanking fire from the reference point of El Alamein. The battle lasted until long after dark, and the Australian infantry showed that it is the same as a formidable opponent, whom we met during the first siege of Tobruk.
Rommel mapped out to resume the offensive the next day on July 15, but the 2nd New Zealand Division and 5th Indian Division brigade attacked at night, “Brescia” nakryazhe Ruwaysat and deeply penetrated in her location. The enemy reached the stronghold of Deir el Shein and threatened to disrupt our entire line of defense. However, he failed to build on their success, and the evening of July 15 the 15th Division with a 3-m and 33-m reconnaissance has taken a decisive counter-attack and captured more than 1,200 prisoners. But the Italians lost two thousand prisoners, 12 precious 88-mm guns out of the hands of New Zealanders {151} . In addition, the enemy pinned important position on the ridge Ruwaysat.
July 16 Australians have renewed their attacks from a ledge at Tel el Eisa, they smashed remains of the Italian division “Sabratha”, but were stopped by the German 382nd Infantry Regiment and the concentrated fire of all available artillery. At dawn on July 17 Australians attacked again by the strong support of the tank in the direction of the ridge Miteyriya. They broke through the front divisions “Trieste” and “Trento” and were stopped by a German parts, slung from a central site. In the second half of the day were made strong counterattack with air support, the Australians were pushed back, losing several hundred prisoners.
The battle grew into a struggle of attrition, and despite the heavy losses inflicted by the 8th Army, our tank army was in critical condition. Just throwing in a fight last reserves, we were able to hold the front; Italian units literally falling apart, and all of the burden of fighting carried on myself extremely tired German divisions. We were forced to enter the German part of the Italian divisions in the band to give them the necessary strength of the defense, and tried every means to improve their minefields and fortifications. In the British ruling circles Auchinleck criticized for his persistent attacks in July 1942, but it must be said that several times he was very close to success. [128]
Between 18 and 21 July the action of the 8th Army were limited to the search for intelligence and conducting harassing fire, and we used the respite to strengthen their positions. July 17 we were visited by Kesselring and Cavallero, and Rommel pointed out that we are on the verge of collapse and can not keep their positions if to solve the problem of supply nothing is done [152] .
Auchinleck was preparing for a final attack: this time it is intended to capture the ridge Ruwaysat in conjunction with the punches of the 9th Australian Division of Tel el Eisa and the 1st South African Division in the direction of the ridge Miteyriya. In the night from 21 to 22 July 161 Indian Brigade and the 6th New Zealand Brigade launched an attack on the ridge Ruwaysat and El Mireyr. It quickly was a success, and the morning of July 22 after a fierce battle the New Zealanders have reached trough El Mireyr. British tanks must [129] have supported the 6th New Zealand Brigade, but did not arrive in time, the 15th Panzer Division counterattacked and took several hundred prisoners.

Then moved forward 23rd British Armoured Brigade, who had just arrived from England, Shai – it was, later wrote, “real Balaclava attack” {153} . The tanks were under heavy enemy anti-tank guns, were a minefield and were defeated by a counterattack 21 minutes Division. Battalion 161st Indian Brigade managed to break into Deir el-Shane, but it was destroyed by a counterattack. Thus, the British offensive in the center over the disaster: because of the total lack of communication and control they have lost much more than a hundred tanks and 1,400 prisoners.
On the northern sector of the front, Australians and South Africans have made some progress, but they failed to make any significant breakthrough. Although we suffered heavy losses, especially among the German infantry, the result of fighting on July 22 was for us a very favorable and renewed hope that we will be able to hold out at El Alamein.
For 23 – 26 July at the front again, there was a lull, but on the night of 26 to 27 July the Australians attacked vigorously from Tel el Eisa and captured Sanet El Miteyriya. Under the plan, the South Africans were to the south of the item passes to make their own minefield for the 69th British Infantry Brigade and the 1st Armored Division. 69th Brigade deeply wedged in our positions, but fortunately for us, the commander of the 1st Armored Division, {154} stated that the passages Realized South Africans are too narrow and is not to be extended, it will not carry them through their tanks. Thus, the 69th Infantry Brigade was left without support and suffered huge losses during counterattack battle group Afrika Korps, supported by the 200th Infantry Regiment. The Australians were also counterattacked and pushed to their original positions with heavy losses.
Now the fighting at El Alamein stopped: both sides were exhausted, and none of them could count on a decisive success without significant reinforcements. Panzer Army was unable to get out to the Nile, but 15, 22 and 27 July, we have won important victories in defensive battles, and losses have been much less than that of the enemy.
The Battle of Alam Halfa

In August 1942, the command of the German-Italian Panzer armiee faced with the need to take this or that decision-charge for further action. As well Rommel said, “a big summer campaign is over dangerous lull” {155} . Our presence at El Alamein forced the Anglo-American war machine to work in full swing: the Red Sea and the Suez Canal was an escort for the convoy, and it was clear that the enemy is far ahead of us in the creation of reserves. Moreover, these convoys were only the beginning of a huge flow of troops and war material sent to the Middle East, and by mid-September 8th army could launch an attack suppressive forces.
Supply status of our forces is a serious concern. Malta has successfully restored its power, and now we are paying for something that is not able to grab it in time. An alarming increase in the range and increase the number of English-range bombers, and they attacked the ships at the port of Cyrenaica and prevented post along the coast in the direction of Bardia and Mersa Matruh. As a result of the strong bombardment [130] August 8 Tobruk its port facilities were permanently incapacitated “Benghazi and Tobruk defended even very far from the front, and a long way to bringing up between the ports of supply and El Alamein made ​​our vehicles to work with the incredible stress. Out- the lack of locomotives we can only to a limited extent to use the railway between Tobruk and El Daba, but here British bombers found enticing targets for them. However, we have captured a huge warehouse in Cyrenaica and Egypt, but they are no longer able to provide us with fuel and ammunition. Given these factors, coupled with incompetence or sabotage the Italian decision-makers in charge by land and by sea, it is clear that we can no longer remain in limbo at El Alamein.
Panzer Army headquarters carefully studied the issue and prepared a detailed report of the commander. A possible solution was the cynosure of all non-motorized connections to Libya, leaving only the front of the tank and motorized divisions. The British had the advantage in trench warfare, while Rommel proved its superiority in the art of maneuvering. Since we are not tied to a specific location, you can expect that we will for a long time did not allow the invasion of the British in Cyrenaica. But Hitler never would have agreed with the decision relating to the territorial losses, so had no other choice but to try to go forward to the Nile, because we have been able to make such an attempt (see note on page 134).
Such was the situation before the Battle of Alam Halfa – the turning point of the war in the desert and the first in a long series of defeats on all fronts, presage the collapse of Germany. I must stress that, soberly assessing the military situation, the headquarters of Panzer Army did not expect that we will be able to break through to the Nile, and even before the onset we pointed Rommel, that the superiority of the British in the tanks is expressed as 3:1, and in the air – 5: 1. Later information indicated that we exaggerated the superiority of the British in the tank – a tank army had 229 German and 243 Italian tanks, compared to about 700 British, but the British superiority in aircraft is not to be questioned, and it was impossible to object to our argument that we do not would be enough fuel for a major battle. The British artillery was much larger, and the front of the 8th Army was now well covered by minefields. This meant that we can not expect to succeed if inflict a frontal attack, and the lack of fuel was a fatal obstacle to any attempt to outflank 8th Army {156} .
Rommel made ​​an impression on the arguments of his staff, and he seriously thought about to give up the offensive. But in the end he believed the assurances Kesselring that he will be able to fly in about 325 tons of gasoline per day, in addition, we counted on arrival at Tobruk in late August, a large tanker. Kesselring really fulfilled his promise, but most of the fuel was used up during the long way to the front, and the sinking of the tanker precious submarine against Tobrukskoy Bay on August 31 killed any hope of a successful outcome of the battle. We were forced to launch an attack on the night of 30 to August 31 in order to take advantage of the full moon. Any further delay would mean a delay of three weeks, as in these circumstances there could be no question. [131]
In August, we heard about important changes in command of British troops. General Alexander replaced Auchinleck, and General Montgomery took command of the 8th Army. There is no doubt that under the new leadership of the British fighting capacity has increased significantly, and the 8th Army first received the commander who led the troops to feel a firm hand. Auchinleck was the perfect strategist and possessed many qualities of an outstanding military leader, but he seems to have found inconsistency in tactical matters, and perhaps the ability to force their subordinates to execute his orders. He saved the 8th Army in Operation “Crusader” and saved it again in early July, but his subsequent offensives in the same month, British troops treated too expensive, with no success, and from a tactical point of view, was extremely erratic. I can not say to what extent this was guilty of Auchinleck and his corps commanders – Ramsden and Gott. But, in light of the July fighting, I think that Churchill did reasonably replacing Auchinleck {157} . [132]
Montgomery is undoubtedly a major tactician, prudent and diligent in developing their plans, it is ruthless when it comes to implementing them. He introduced a new spirit in the 8th Army and once again proved the great importance of the factor of personal leadership in war. As we could not break through the front of the 8th Army, had to find ways to bypass, and Rommel decided to act much the same as under the El-Ghazal. Italian infantry, reinforced by the 164th Infantry Division and other German units, was to hold the front from the sea to a point ten miles south of the ridge Ruwaysat; strike group in the 90th legkopehotnoy Division (on the left), theItalian armored corps and the Afrika Korps had to work around the left flank of the British and the move towards a ridge Alam Halfa – a key position in the rear of the 8th Army, the capture of which decided the fate of the battle. If successful, 21th Division was to advance on Alexandria, and 15 th and 90 th Division – to move to Cairo {158} .
The attack began on the night of 30 to 31 August. Westphal then already returned from sick leave and took up his duties the first staff officer. Rommel Westphal took with him to the command post, I was in the second tier of staff around Sidi Abd-er-Rahman, and therefore can not talk about the battle only on the basis of different sources.
To go around the front of the 8th Army to the south Caret el Abd, it was necessary to penetrate the dense mine belt that the British set up to the Qattara Depression. From the very beginning of the offensive met difficulties as minefields were much more sophisticated than we imagined, and the English departments covering inflicted heavy losses groups clearance. This upset all our plans, and Montgomery had enough time to regroup his troops. British aircraft bombed the passages in minefields; General Nehring, the commander of the Afrika Korps, was wounded during an air raid, and General von Bismarck, the talented commander of the 21st Division, was killed in a mortar shelling. At dawn on August 31 Afrika Korps still wandering in the minefields, while the estimated Rommel he had to move north to the ridge Alam Halfa.
At one time, Rommel began to lean towards the fact that the offensive end, but when the Afrika Korps under the strong leadership of Bayerlein overcame minefields and made ​​significant progress towards the east, he decided to continue it. The whole day was raging strong sandstorm, and although it made ​​it difficult to move, but at the same time greatly hampered by the actions of British bombers. On the way to the Alam Halfa Afrika Korps met a quicksand, causing further delay and high fuel consumption. In his book “Operation Victory” (p. 148) General de Gingan tells how no-man’s-land of British intelligence slipped us a false map of the area, I can confirm that the card was accepted as authentic and served its purpose, forcing the Afrika Korps to go wrong way {159} .
Only in the evening on August 31 Afrika Korps was able to launch an attack Alam Halfa. Stumps defended 44th Infantry Division and the 22th Armoured Brigade, and its heavy tanks “Grant” were dug into the ground and supported by a strong [133] artillery fire. African body has taken a strong attack with the support of dive-bombers were ahead of the new tanks T-IV. Their 75-mm cannon with a large muzzle velocity caused a significant loss of British tanks, but the defense was too strong, and the attack was not successful.
Transport convoy on the way through the minefields were very sensitive to attacks of the 7th Armored Division from the south and east, and on the night of August 31 to September 1 bivouacs Afrika Korps was heavily bombed. By the morning of September 1 is so short of fuel that Rommel had to attack Alam Halfa only one of the 15th Armored Division. It was clear that a frontal attack has little chance of success, and in other circumstances Rommel, of course, would turn to the east, and tried using the maneuver to force the British to leave their positions. However, the lack of fuel precludes any such attempt.
Montgomery concentrated at Alam Halfa 10th Armored Division had in this important area of ​​up to 400 tanks. Attack of the 15th Division had failed, British artillery continuously beaten by the Afrika Korps and the continuing air strikes caused serious losses. Fuel was running out, and without fuel tank division slightly better piles of scrap metal. The question of the seizure of Alam Halfa and to break the bank fell away, the very existence of the Afrika Korps was threatened. All day on September 1 tanks stood motionless, unable either to advance or to retreat, being subjected to continuous shelling and aerial bombardment.
The morning of September 2 Rommel decided to retreat, but the lack of fuel: not allowed during the day take a greater number of parts, and the Afrika Korps had to remain in place under the continuing udgrami bombs and shells. The circumstances were very favorable to the British counter-attack, but Montgomery did not take any steps, not counting the harassment of the 7th Armored Division to the north and west of the Caret El Himeymat.
September 3rd Strike Group Rommel retreated under way west: we left 50 tanks, 50 field and anti-tank guns, and about 400 damaged vehicles. New Zealand Division attacked at night in the southern; direction of Deir el-Munassib, but after a stubborn fight was stopped. By 6 September the battle was over, the only consolation was that we continued to hold the value of having a great British minefields in the southern sector of the front.
The 8th Army had every reason to rejoice in this victory that destroyed our last hope to reach the Nile, and to show that the British have considerably improved their tactics. Leaders battle Montgomery is characterized by a very skilful, although overly cautious actions that follow the best traditions of English art of war, and in some ways reminiscent of the victory of Wellington. There is no doubt that he knowingly used a golden opportunity to cut off and destroy the Afrika Korps, when he September 1 and 2 was not able to move. Montgomery is justified by reference to the general situation and the need for a broad offensive and observes: “The level of preparation of the compounds of the 8th Army was such that I did not consider it possible to recklessly throw them to the enemy,” {160} . Sure, it’s a compelling argument, but it was felt that the reputation of Rommel and his skill in applying generally accepted counter-attacks are directly related to the manifested Montgomery caution.
The war in the desert

Four [134] a month I was sick severe amoebic dysentery. By early September, at the headquarters of Rommel could not I already do, and our doctor strongly encouraged me to fly to Germany. Westphal, who I deputized as first staff officer in June 1942, is now back, and in addition, has been appointed as the new third staff officer, Major Tsolling, two months held this position.
Yet I found it hard to part with North Africa and with those with whom I have shared adversity heavy flowing with varying success battles in the desert, especially since, as I understand that the position of the German-Italian Panzer Army-ray after our last effort in late August has substantially hopeless.
September 9, when I reported to Rommel to surrender office, he handed me a report to OKH (Army High Command), which I had to hand himself Chief of the General Staff. In this report, he noted the disastrous state of the supply tank army and persistently asked for help. The document ends with the following words:
“If the tank army will not be delivered absolutely necessary supplies, it will not be able to resist the combined forces of the United States and the British Empire, that is, the forces of the two world powers. Despite his bravery, Panzer Army, sooner or later have to share the fate of the defenders Halfayi.”
In fact, at this point the only way out was driving the mobile defense, take the bulk of our troops in Libya. Rejection of such acts condemned tank army to destruction, just as such. same position decided the fate of the 6th Army at Stalingrad, Paulus {161} .
It is useless to speculate on what might have been if Rommel was in Africa, in October, when Montgomery began its offensive. Rommel at the time was on sick leave, he immediately flew to Africa, but arrived at the scene found that the situation is very dangerous, and the reserves have already been partially consumed. Taking into account the large numerical superiority, which had Montgomery and his strong determination to win at all costs, I do not see how you can avoid defeat.
In conclusion, I would like to make a few observations about the nature of war in the desert.
First, as our Italian allies, I do not share the view of those who speaks contemptuously of the Italian soldiers, without taking the trouble to think about the adverse conditions in which they had to act. Italian Army Armament not meet modern requirements, the tanks were light and very unreliable from a technical point of view. Firing range of most Italian guns does not exceed 8 km, while the effective range of English systems ranged from 8 to 25 km. Italian radio station did not correspond terms of maneuver warfare and could not work while driving. Ration was not enough, there was no field kitchens and there was a dramatic difference in the diet of officers and soldiers. The level of training and combat skills of junior officers were very low, and the close connection with the officers of the soldiers had not. However, senior commanders and staff officers differed quite good preparation and generally cope with their tasks.
During the campaign in North Africa, Italian troops have repeatedly proved their bravery and courage, especially when it relates to those who came from the [135] old cavalry regiments, as well as for aircraft parts. But, although they could attack with a large gust, they lacked composure and tranquility needed in critical circumstances, and, in general, the quality of the Italian military compounds and the 8th Army are not comparable.
Division of the 8th Army, whether British, Indian, New Zealand, South African or Australian, were quite different – resistant, have high morale troops. Especially good was the group of long-range in the desert. During my service in Africa many times I have had the opportunity to observe the imperturbable coolness of the British in any combat situation.
I do not intend to discuss here the issues of managing the operations of the British command, the British made profound mistakes and suffered a series of heavy defeats, which they could have avoided. Even the best of their generals did not know how to act so boldly and flexibly as Rommel, and I do not think that the British have ever managed to solve the problem of conducting a war of maneuver in the open desert. In general, the English method of warfare is characterized by slowness, lack of flexibility and methodical; British rely on its sea power and the vast resources of his empire and dominion. It is likely that the senior officers of the British air force more enterprising and adventurous than the officers of the army, and by the way, I can say that the English Mediterranean fleet has given a number of talented officers.
The fighting in North Africa were heavy on both sides, but they were conducted fairly. With the prisoners were well treated, and the opponents developed a sense of mutual respect. It combines a sense of the veterans of the war in the desert, no matter which side they fought, and I had plenty of time to make sure that, when I spoke to the South African Union with our former enemies.
One of the most remarkable examples of chivalrous spirit that Promote and strengthen the battle in the Western Desert, is a speech by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on January 27, 1942, when he said of Rommel: “We have before us a very daring and skillful opponent and – if I may prove, despite the frenzy of war – an outstanding general. ” In his memoirs, he wrote: {162}
“My mention of Rommel got away safely at the time, but later I found out that some of it is warped. They simply could not imagine how there can be any positive quality at an enemy commander. This bias is a well-known feature of human nature, but it contrary to the spirit by which won the war and established a lasting peace. “